Review of McCormack’s Essay

A Summary of conclusions can be found here where I interact with McCormack’s response to Clark.  It’s more concise than what is below!

McCormack states his conclusion at the outset; namely, that the Christology of the HTFC (Historical and Theological Field Committee) report is indeed ‘orthodox’ but not Reformed. I don’t think McCormack intends to suggest that Reformed Christology is therefore unorthodox but instead he allows for a broad understanding of what ‘orthodoxy’ is, especially with reference to the Chalcedon Creed. McCormack’s case rests upon two important assertions, both of which I hope to challenge. First, he posits a tension in the Chalcedonian Creed that allows for competing Christologies; at best, his suggestion implies that there is some ambiguity in the Creed that allows for the tension; at worst, he is saying the Creed contradicts itself. A lot of this depends on whether we understand Chalcedon to be a compromise ‘document’ between the Antiochene Christology and Alexandrian Christology. Second, as a result of the dichotomization of the Creed, McCormack suggests that the HTFC report is not in fact Antiochene – and, thus, Reformed – but, ironically, Alexandrian!

For those not up to speed on the certain terms that are used when discussing Christology, this article is somewhat helpful insofar as it tries to speak to a wider audience; i.e. beyond academia. But, despite his omission of Latin terms (e.g. communicatio idiomatum), McCormack is insufficiently clear in a number of places, the very problem he directs to the HTFC report. More on this later.

Also noteworthy is the fact that McCormack’s chief intention is to show that the HTFC is not Reformed because of certain statements that better reflect Eastern Orthodox and Lutheran Christology. But, in making his case, he provides us with only two quotes from the HTFC report. And, I would say, quotes divorced from their immediate and larger context.

I am thankful that McCormack took the time to explain Reformed Christology. He does so with some care, though he argues for some problematic lines of demarcation. For those who are untrained in certain terms, let me elaborate on what McCormack is saying. First, he shows that the Reformed and Lutherans have historically disagreed on the “communication of properties” (communicatio iodiomatum). While the Reformed make a sharp distinction between the two natures of Christ – rejecting the Lutheran commingling of the divine and human – they vigorously maintained the unity of the person. McCormack argues that the Lutherans placed their weight on the “unity of the Person” whereas the Reformed placed the emphasis on the formula “two natures unimpaired in their original integrity subsequent to their union”. However, this places the Reformed on the horns of a false dilemma. Does an insistence on distinguishing between the two natures militate against the “unity of the Person”? The Reformed also self-consciously resisted Nestorianism because they argued that the person of the Son became flesh, not the substance but the subsistence. The unity of Christ’s divine and human nature is anchored in the person. The tension is not as sharp as McCormack would like to think, at least not for the Reformed. John Owen was heavily dependent on Cyril’s Christology in his exposition of the doctrine of the incarnation. And if Owen does see a problem with Chalcedon, it is not the tension between the two natures and the unity of the person, but the Definition’s failure to posit the means of its own integration, that is, by an affirmation of the Spirit’s work in/on the person of Christ.

Next, McCormack discusses the “communication of operations” (communicatio operationum). For the Reformed, this means, as the WCF argues, “Christ, in the work of mediation, acteth according to both natures; by each nature doing that which is proper to itself (8.7). As Thomas Goodwin argued: “We all know and acknowledge Christ’s Person hath two Natures, He is God, he is Man; and we often find in one and the same sentence several things attributed to the Person of Christ, whereof the one is spoken of him in respect of the Human nature only, the other in relation to the Divine” (Works, I, Ephesians, Pt. I, p. 24, 1691-1704 ed.). For example, Goodwin writes, commenting on Hebrews 7:3 (Without father or mother, without genealogy, without beginning of days or end of life, like the Son of God he remains a priest forever.), “his Person is described to be without Father, without Mother, and both are equally said of this one and the same Person; yet the one in respect of one nature only, the other in relation to the other” (Ibid).

Flowing from this, as McCormack argues, is the Reformed doctrine of “Spirit-Christology”, a particularly nuanced approach to Christology in the seventeenth century. The Reformed have always maintained that the external works of the Trinity are undivided. Goodwin writes: “You must know, that all the works of the Three Persons, what one doth the other two are said to do. It is a certain Rule, that Opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisia, all their works to us-ward of Creation and Redemption, and whatsoever else, they are all works of each Person concurring to them. As they have but one Being, one Essence, so they have but one work …” (Works, I, Ephesians, Pt. 1, 401).

However, because they have several subsistences (modus subsistendi), the persons have several manners of working. So, while the Father is said to raise Christ (Rom 4:24; Col. 2:12-13), it is also true that Christ raised himself (Jn. 2:19; 10:17-18 ) and the Spirit raised Christ (Rom. 8:11). Because ‘all Three Persons concur in every work’, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are said to have raised Christ from the dead. However, in raising Christ from the dead, his body ‘concurred nothing to it, for that was dead, but the Son of God, the Second Person, concurred and raised up that Body and Soul.’ (Ibid, p. 402).

Notwithstanding this basic principle of attributing ad extra works to all the persons of the Trinity, Goodwin argues that certain outward works – depending on what they are – are more peculiarly attributed to one of the persons. That is to suggest that the persons all share a common prerogative, but often a certain work will be attributed to the Father, for example, in order to display his uniqueness. Both Goodwin and Owen wrestle with how this relates to the incarnation of the Son of God. So, for example, while some Divines attribute to the Spirit ‘the special Honour of tying that Marriage knot, or Union, between the Son of God, and that Man Jesus’, Goodwin believes that ‘that Action is more peculiarly to be Attributed to the Son Himself; as Second Person; who took up into one Person with Himself that Humane Nature’ (Heb. 2:16) (Works, V, Holy Ghost, 8). Of course, Goodwin agrees that if they argue on the basis that the external works of the Trinity are undivided, there is no disagreement. But, in Goodwin’s mind, it was ‘the Son’s Special Act … to assume [human nature]’ (Ibid). Owen argues that it was an outward act (ad extra) of the Triune God, ‘As unto original efficiency’. However, ‘As unto authoritative designation, it was the act of the Father …. As unto the formation of the human nature, it was the peculiar act of the Spirit …. As unto the term of the assumption, or the taking of our nature unto himself, it was the peculiar act of the person of the Son.’ (Works, I, Of the Person of Christ, 225.)

Essentially, Goodwin and Owen are claiming that the undivided works ad extra often manifest one of the persons as their terminus operationis. In the above example, the incarnation terminates on the Son though the act is willed by the three persons of the Trinity.

In terms of Christ as the God-man (McCormack seems to prefer God-human, but I’m sticking with “man”), we can ask a basic Christological question. How does Christ cast out demons? By the power of the Spirit (Matt. 12:28). Moreover, Christ’s wisdom, power, knowledge, teaching, healings, temptations, etc., are all to be understood as being performed by the Spirit and not the divine nature. The Spirit descended on Christ, particularly at his baptism, to equip him for his ministry. As I suggested, if Owen did take issue with Chalcedon, it was in regards to the pneumatic aspect of Christ’s work as the God-man.

McCormack’s dichotomizing

McCormack’s case rests upon the assertion that there is ambiguity in terms of what “Person” means.

1) 1. “the property of each nature being preserved, and concurring in one Person and one Subsistence” – McCormack argues: “on the basis of the first formulation, it would seem that the person is formed out of the coming together of the natures.”

2) 2. “not parted or divided into two persons, but one and the same Son, and only begotten, God the Word, the Lord Jesus Christ” – Based on these words, McCormack suggests: “On the basis of the second, it would seem that a straightforward and direct equation is being made of the ‘person’ and the pre-existent logos as such.”

Now, McCormack wants to argue that the HTFC report – perhaps unwittingly and certainly ironically – holds to #2 along with the Eastern Orthodox and Lutherans. The first view, according to McCormack, “grants a certain victory to Nestorius”. What is interesting is that he then suggests that “classical Reformed theology clearly stood on the side of the first of these options, not the second.” The implication seems to be that Reformed Christology is inherently (or, at least, partly) Nestorian. This is only because of a forced dichotomy on McCormack’s part.

But do Reformed theologians argue for such a dichotomy? Which camp do you think Goodwin falls into? He writes: “The Sonship of the Man Christ Jesus doth coalesce into one Sonship with the Son of God, even as in like manner the Man is taken up into One person with the Son of God … though he was Man, yet that Man was never a person of itself, but subsisted from the first in the personality of the second Person: so that Son of Man was never called or accounted a Son of God, of himself, as such; but his Sonship was that of the Person, which he was taken up into” (Works, I, Ephesians, Pt. I, p. 26). Goodwin is not arguing for an either/or here; it is not #1 or #2 but #1 AND #2 (i.e. Chalcedonian). Christ as man was “never a person of itself, but subsisted from the first in the personality of the second Person”. This sounds, ironically, a lot like #2 and, hence, the HTFC report. I am surprised that Goodwin ‘allies’ himself so easily with Eastern Orthodoxy by equating “person” with the Logos and “thereby turning [his] back on the Reformed tradition”. The divine is indeed “essential and the locus of personality,” both for Goodwin and the HTFC (p. 20).

McCormack chides the HTFC writers for the following statement: “Orthodox Christology affirms that the human nature of Christ has not personality or subsistence of its own, but subsists only in its union with the Logos”. He calls this statement “confused”. But the HTFC report sounds a lot like Goodwin who was a framer of the Westminster Confession. Hence, the charge that the HTFC report is more Eastern than Reformed is altogether misguided.

As I said earlier, the fact that McCormack’s case rests upon two quotes from the report (and a footnote connected to one of the quotes) will inevitably raise problems. The report says: “In light of a biblical, Chalcedonian and Reformed Christology, the divine is essential and the locus of personality, and the human is contingent, dependent on the divine (yet real) (p. 20).” McCormack only quotes the first part of this sentence. But what is clear is that the HTFC writers in no way deny “to the human Jesus a mind, will and energy of operation”. The human is contingent upon the divine, yet it is still nevertheless real and so there is no denial that Christ’s human nature possessed a mind, will and energy of operation. Rather, like Goodwin, the divine is essential and locus because it precedes the human by virtue of the fact that the Son is the eternal Son, and second person in the Trinity.

Conclusion: McCormack’s case fails because both of his major premises fail. First, while some scholars have argued for a tension or, even worse, contradiction, in the Chalcedonian Creed (i.e. John McGuckin), the Reformed have historically been comfortable with the Creed’s definition of Christ’s person. Yes, the Reformed have insisted on not confusing the two natures, but, with equal rigor, they have maintained the unity of Christ’s person, albeit differently than the Eastern Orthodox and Lutherans. Second, McCormack’s argument that the HTFC report is somehow un-Reformed betrays the facts, especially in light of the writings of Owen and Goodwin. Owen’s criticism of Chalcedon centered on Christo-pneumatology, not on personhood. And Goodwin’s formulations are consistent with the findings and contentions of the HTFC report. Hence, McCormack’s thesis is more imagined than real. Lastly, drawing two rather incomplete quotes from the report is hardly a way of stating a case. McCormack spent far more time explaining Reformed Christology than he did interacting with the details of the report. His two quotes from the report illustrate more his own reading into the report than the reports so-called “Eastern and Lutheran Christology”.

Finally, McCormack writes: “Polemical situations rarely provide a seed-bed for careful theology. And that, it seems to me, is worth thinking about.” And in what context were the ecumenical creeds framed? Or are the creeds not careful in their theology. I would suggest, quite to the contrary, that polemical situations are precisely the seed-bed for careful theology, hence the making of the Westminster Confession and the ecumenical creeds.